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Brazil has come a long way over the last 15 years or
so. Different administrations have maintained and
built on a macroeconomic framework combining
inflation targeting, a flexible exchange rate and
rules-based fiscal management. This policy setting
has served the country well (see Table 1). It has
paved the way for a gradual stabilisation of govern-
ment indebtedness, which has allowed for a coun-
tercyclical response to the slowdown in activity
brought about by the global crisis of 2008–09 in an
environment of reasonably low and stable inflation.
Structural reforms during the 1990s, not least to
liberalise the country’s trade and investment
regimes and to make regulations in product mar-
kets and network industries more pro-competition,
have yielded important productivity gains and alle-
viated several structural impediments to faster
growth. Good policies have
been essential, but external con-
ditions have also been support-
ive. Brazil benefited from a sta-
ble global economy and rising
commodity prices during most
of the 2000s. Equally impor-
tantly, the benefits of strong
growth are being shared more
equally across social groups,
leading to an improvement in
Brazil’s notoriously skewed
income distribution.
Brazil’s growth prospects also appear to be improving.
A resumption in investment and robust employment
growth have raised the economy’s potential output
growth. But the country’s ability to sustain stronger
growth over the longer term will depend on further
structural reform to remove existing impediments to
investment, job creation and productivity gains. The
agenda for further reform is vast: it will require con-
solidating macroeconomic stability to allow the coun-
try to reap the benefits of external support in good
times and to withstand adverse shock in bad times. It
will also call on the new administration that took
office on 1 January to address the short-term chal-
lenges associated with an overheated economy and to
make headways in structural reform areas where
progress has so far been difficult.
This chapter briefly reviews trends in Brazil’s eco-
nomic growth history over the last quarter of a cen-
tury to highlight strengths and weaknesses, and to
identify the policy challenges that will need to be
tackled to improve the country’s growth prospects
and to sustain strong growth in the years to come.
The chapter then lays out the main pro-growth struc-
tural reforms that would need to be implemented to
address current weaknesses and identifies areas
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–09 2010 2011 2012
Real GDP growth
(annual, %) 2.0 3.0 3.5 7.5 4.5 4.5
Inflation (CPI, 
annual, %) 9.6 8.6 4.7 5.6 5.8 4.7
Budget balance 
(public sector, %
of GDP) .. – 5.0 – 3.5 – 3.0 – 2.9 – 2.2
Primary budget
balance (public
sector, % of GDP)  .. 3.8 3.5 3.3 2.8 3.0
Current account
balance (% of 




period, % of GDP) .. 49.5 45.6 40.9 39.2 38.0
Source: Central Bank of Brazil and median market expectations for
2011–12 (Central Bank of Brazil survey).
* OECD Economics Department. Thanks
are due, without implicating, to José
Roberto Afonso, Martim Ramos Ca-
valcanti, Alzira Rosa Morais da Silva and
Teresa Ter-Minassian for helpful comments
and discussions. The views and opinions
expressed in this paper are the author’s own
and do not necessarily reflect those of the
OECD and the Organisation’s member
countries.where further reform will be nec-
essary to consolidate macroeco-
nomic stability.
Laying out the task ahead
Brazil’s overarching policy chal-
lenge in the years to come is to
build on and sustain the improve-
ment of the recent years in the
economy’s growth performance.
Following a quarter-century-long
period of lacklustre growth that
started in the early 1980s, Brazil’s
GDP growth rate has picked up
since the mid-2000s, despite the
slowdown associated with the
global crisis of 2008–09. As a
result of this improvement in
growth outcomes, the gap in
Brazil’s per capita income (mea-
sured at purchasing power pari-
ty) relative to the OECD average
has narrowed, although it is esti-
mated to remain large, at about
65 percent in 2010.
Effective utilisation of inputs –
physical capital and labour – as
well as productivity enhancement
will be needed to sustain robust
growth in the years to come. GDP
growth has been driven essential-
ly by a recovery in physical capi-
tal accumulation, albeit from
very low investment levels (dis-
cussed below) and improved use
of labour (Figure 1). Total factor
productivity (TFP), which mea-
sures the overall efficiency with which inputs are
combined in production, has also been on an upward
trend, despite having often acted as a drag on the
expansion of output, especially in the 1980s and early
1990s (de Mello 2008). This is an important develop-
ment, because overall productivity gains, captured by
TFP growth, accounts for most of the variation in
output growth across OECD countries.
Extrapolation of recent trends in factor accumulation
and productivity enhancement suggests that Brazil’s
potential GDP growth is on the rise. It is difficult to
estimate potential output growth accurately, especial-
ly in times of rapid economic transformation. Not-
withstanding these difficulties and on the basis of
conventional growth accounting and plausible pro-
jections for investment and labour force growth over
the medium term, most estimates point to a rate of
growth of potential GDP in the neighbourhood of
4.5 percent per year over the next five years. The rate
of growth of Brazil’s potential output is higher than
that of OECD countries on average, which is cur-
rently estimated at about 1.5 percent per year
(2008–11 average) (OECD 2010). Comparison of
potential GDP growth rates is instructive: if the
wedge in potential growth rates could be sustained
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BRAZIL'S LONG-TERM GROWTH PERFORMANCE
A. GDP growth rate and trends, 1950–2012
B. GDP growth and its components, 1980–2009







a) Defined as the ratio of Brazil’s income per capita to the average of the OECD countries in purchasing
power parity (PPP) terms. The median market expectations reported in Table 1 for Brazil and OECD fore-
casts for GDP growth are used to calculate the income ratios for 2010–12.
Source: IPEA, World Bank, Central Bank of Brazil and OECD (Economic Outlook database).CESifo Forum 1/2011 5
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over the longer term, it would take about 35 years for
Brazil to close its current income gap relative to the
OECD area.
The benefits of improved growth in a stable macroeco-
nomic environment are being shared more equally
across social groups. The resumption of strong
growth has resulted in a fall in the incidence of
poverty to about 16 percent of households in 2009
from almost 24 percent in 2005 on the basis of a
broadly agreed national poverty benchmark. And,
probability most importantly, sustained growth is
beginning to make a dent in Brazil’s notorious
income distribution indicators. For example, the
Gini coefficient fell by about 4.5 percent during
2005–09, or 0.9 percent per year, from nearly 0.57 in
2005. Increased emphasis since the late 1990s on tar-
geted conditional transfer programmes has undoubt-
edly played an important role. But improvements in
the distribution of labour income on the back of ris-
ing human capital have account-
ed for a large of the decline in
income inequality according to
some decomposition exercises
(IPEA 2006; Paes de Barros,
Franco and Mendonça 2007;
Soares 2008).
Structural reform to sustain
strong growth
Effective labour utilization: the
role of low human capital and
informality
The level of education of the
Brazilian labour force is compara-
tively low and needs to be raised.
On the basis of the cross-country
indicators available from the
OECD’s Education at a Glance
database, educational achieve-
ment for upper-secondary educa-
tion point to a serious human
capital deficiency (Figure 2). The
quality of education, gauged by
student performance in stan-
dardised tests, such as the OECD
Programme for International
Student Assessment (PISA), is
also low. This is despite signifi-
cant improvements in recent
years, which are due in part to
efforts since the late 1990s to facilitate access to edu-
cation, especially up to the upper-secondary school
level. By contrast, and unlike many OECD countries,
potential GDP growth does not seem to be held back
by insufficient labour supply, since Brazil’s labour
force participation is on a par with the average of
OECD countries for prime-age males (aged 25–54
years), although it is somewhat lower for females
(OECD 2006). Since access to education is already
nearly universal until the lower-secondary level, poli-
cies are now focusing on improving access to higher
levels of education and the quality of services, includ-
ing vocational education and labour training.
Effective follow-through is essential, because invest-
ment in education takes a long time to come to
fruition. Policy mistakes, if not remedied, are there-
fore costly.
Labour informality also needs to be reduced further on
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a) Year of reference is 2002
A. Population that has attained at least upper secondary education by age 
cohort, 2008




Figure 2the Brazilian employed population is considered
informal, defined as those workers who do not con-
tribute to social security and/or are self-employed. By
a narrower definition that excludes own-account
workers, who may contribute to social security as self-
employed, the informality rate drops to close to
20 percent of the employed population (OECD 2009).
As far as potential growth is concerned, the problem
with labour informality, however measured, is that it
holds back productivity growth, because employers
have little incentive to invest in the human capital of
workers with a precarious attachment to the enter-
prise. Informal workers are also often ineligible for
off-the-job labour training programmes and, as a
result, are likely to be trapped in low-pay, low-skill
jobs. Moreover, labour informality is closely related to
business informality, which aggravates the problem,
because the capacity of informal businesses to
expand, invest in the human capital of employees and
innovate is constrained by limited, often costly, access
to credit. Informality therefore perpetuates segmenta-
tion in the labour market and in the business sector,
which impedes economic growth by constraining
effective labour utilisation and productivity enhance-
ment. At the same time, the impact of informality on
public finances should not be underestimated, espe-
cially against a background of already high spending
on social security benefits in a country with a still rel-
atively young population (discussed below). 
Labour informality is a complex phenomenon that re-
quires remedial policy action in different areas. First
and foremost, efforts to improve the human capital
of the labour force through high-quality education
and labour training services would yield a double
dividend of also militating against informality. There
is ample empirical evidence showing that low educa-
tional attainment is a powerful determinant of a
worker’s probability of obtaining a formal-sector
job. There is also scope for policy intervention to
remove policy-driven impediments to faster labour
formalisation. For example, social assistance pro-
grammes can be designed in a manner that enhances
the opportunity cost of informality, by for instance
making eligibility to certain programmes condition-
al in part on labour market status.1 Moreover,
greater flexibility in certain provisions of the labour
code could reduce impediments to formalisation, so
long as efforts in this area are part of broader initia-
tives to enhance social protection for vulnerable
workers.2 Finally, the burden of taxes on labour
income (social security contributions, payroll taxes,
mandated saving schemes and a number of para-fis-
cal levies to finance labour training programmes)
could be reduced, public finances permitting, espe-
cially for workers on low pay. 
Physical capital accumulation: the lack of investment
At below 20 percent of GDP, Brazil’s investment rate is
low and needs to be raised to sustain faster growth. The
main culprits for a low investment rate include macro-
economic instability during much of the 1980s and
1990s, a lack of long-term financing for the private
sector and fiscal consolidation, which has taken its
toll on public-sector investment in the absence of
structural reform to constrain the expansion of cur-
rent expenditure commitments. Progress has been
made on most of these fronts, albeit with different
degrees of success, especially to improve corporate
governance and promote financial deepening in a
more resilient macroeconomic backdrop. A resump-
tion in public investment nevertheless remains con-
strained by already high and rising current spending
commitments (discussed below). 
More can be done to tackle the microeconomic deter-
rents to private investment by making product market
regulations more pro-competition. This is important,
because the experience of OECD countries suggests
that a regulatory framework that fosters competition
in product markets is an important driver of pro-
ductivity growth (OECD 2002).3 Despite efforts to
boost competition, Brazil’s product market regula-
tions remain more burdensome on average than
those of several OECD countries on the basis of the
OECD methodology for gauging the stringency of a
country’s regulatory framework (see Figure 3). In
particular, Brazil would benefit from lowering
administrative burdens on enterprises and reducing
barriers to foreign trade and investment. Likewise,
based on the most recent edition of the Doing
Business indicators reported by the World Bank,
CESifo Forum 1/2011 6
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1 In the case of Brazil, the fact that individuals are entitled to a
means-tested social assistance pension at 65 years of age that is
equivalent to the minimum wage and unconditional on labour mar-
ket status discourages individuals whose earnings are at or close to
the minimum wage from contributing to social security.
2 The Doing Business indicators reported by the World Bank suggest
that hiring and firing costs are comparatively high in Brazil, which
may discourage employers from hiring low-skilled workers formally.
The OECD index of Employment Protection Legislation also points
to provisions of the Brazilian labour code that could discourage
employers from hiring low-skilled workers formally (OECD 2005; de
Mello 2008).
3 Empirical evidence for Brazil suggests that economic liberalisation
since the early 1990s, through the gradual withdrawal of the public
sector from manufacturing and services, has exposed producers to
competition from abroad and from domestic peers (Schmitz and
Teixeira 2004). At the same time, the alleviation of trade protection
seems to have been particularly important in boosting labour pro-
ductivity (Schor 2004).CESifo Forum 1/2011 7
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Brazil fares particularly poorly in comparison with
OECD countries in matters related to the ease of
opening and closing businesses, and on the basis of
administrative burdens to fulfil foreign trade proce-
dures. Reform in these areas is growth-friendly to the
extent that more pro-competition product market
regulations unleash opportunities for investment and
facilitate the diffusion of technological change
through the economy. 
Consolidating macroeconomic stability
Brazil has strengthened its public finances essentially
through revenue hikes, rather than by containing the
growth of expenditure. Different distributive and
social protection programmes have been introduced
since the early 1990s, including
means-tested transfers to the
elderly and the disable. At the
central government level alone,
spending on payroll is on the
rise, following several years of
stability (Figure 4), and pension
outlays already account for
about 12 percent of GDP (in-
cluding both social assistance
and insurance programmes ben-
efiting private- and public-sector
workers), which is a high share
for a country of Brazil’s demo-
graphic structure and income
level. These expenditure com-
mitments, together with sizeable
primary budget surpluses need-
ed to service a large public debt,
have been financed through suc-
cessive revenue hikes in a fiscal
landscape that, unlike most
emerging-market economies, al-
ready combines a comparatively
high ratio of revenue to GDP
with a fairly complex tax system.
Greater effort is therefore need-
ed to break this vicious spend-
and-tax circle (de Mello 2007),
which may be difficult to sustain
over the longer term without
further prejudice to the econo-
my’s growth potential.
Further increases in the current
expenditure-to-GDP ratio should
be prevented in order to stabilise the tax take in rela-
tion to GDP and create fiscal space for a recovery of
public investment. Expenditure containment should
focus on capping additional increases in payroll com-
mitments, as well as on further pension reform to
strengthen the financial sustainability of the social
security system over the longer term.4 Also, there are
important policy challenges in the tax area, not least
to reduce the tax burden on business and labour,
especially on workers on low pay (discussed above),
and to reform the value added tax at the state level to
improve the efficiency of the tax system and to
4 Several proposals have been put forward in this area, focusing on
options for severing the links between pension benefits and the min-
imum wage, while preserving the purchasing power of the minimum
pension, and the introduction of minimum retirement provisions,
among others Draft legislation to cap pension benefits and to create
complementary pension schemes for civil servants has been in dis-
cussion in the legislature since 2003 – see Giambiagi and de Mello

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































PRODUCT MARKET REGULATION (PMR) SCORES:
BRAZIL, CHINA AND OECD COUNTRIES, 2008
Low scores indicate less restriction

















































































































































B. Adminstrative burdens on startups
C. Barriers to trade and investment
A. Product market regulation
Figure 3reduce the scope for predatory horizontal tax compe-
tition among the states (de Mello 2008). Of course,
until further structural reform has put a lid on expen-
diture growth, policy action on the tax front should
be consistent with revenue neutrality, so that high
enough primary budget surpluses can be generated to
secure a sustained reduction in public indebtedness
over the medium term. At the same time, Brazil will
need to put in place the necessary tools to make the
most of the increases in revenue associated with the
recently discovered oil and gas reserves, when pro-
duction comes on stream, by saving those resources
or using them to finance investments that generate
returns for future generations.
Regained macroeconomic stability has yet to deliver
a sustained reduction in real interest rates. Brazil’s
monetary policy framework
combines inflation targeting
with a flexible exchange rate
and is working well: inflation
has remained by and large with-
in the formal targets, and out-
put and inflation appear to
have become less volatile over
time (Figure 5).5 Policy initia-
tives have also been launched to
strengthen banking supervi-
sion, upgrade the country’s
payments system and deepen
the financial system. The real
cost of credit has therefore fall-
en over time, although it
remains high, especially for
individuals. More can obvious-
ly be done to promote financial
deepening, including by allevi-
ating burdensome constraints
on the allocation of credit in
the economy and high compul-
sory reserve requirements for
banks. However, further reduc-
tions in real interest rates will
depend to a large extent on
additional, sustained declines
in government indebtedness,
which remains high by emerg-
ing-market standards, despite
years of adjustment.
Of course, there are short-term
macroeconomic challenges that
will need to be addressed. Brazil
recovered in earnest from a deep, albeit short-lived,
recession in 2009 on the back of a very supportive
macroeconomic policy mix. Activity is now expand-
ing at a pace that exceeds the economy’s rate of
potential GDP growth, and the output gap is likely
to have been closed. The current account deficit is
widening. Inflation is close to the ceiling of the
inflation target tolerance band, and monetary poli-
cy is appropriately being tightened, including
through macroprudential measures. Fiscal policy,
however, has yet to be tightened to prevent a
counter-cyclical stance during the downturn from
becoming pro-cyclical in the upturn, which would
be destabilising. 











































TREND IN FEDERAL SPENDING AND REVENUE
Cumulative 12-months flows, in % of GDP
Source: National Treasury; author's calculation.
A. Revenue and expenditure (central government)
B. Commponents of expenditure (central government)
C. Debt (general government)
Revenue
Expenditure
(including pension benefits paid to civil servants)
(including investment)
(using the new methodology introduced in 2008)
(net of intergovernmental transfers)
Figure 4
5 See de Mello and Moccero (2011) for empirical evidence for Brazil
and other Latin American inflation targeters.CESifo Forum 1/2011 9
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Conclusions
This chapter has argued that Brazil’s efforts over the
years to consolidate its macroeconomy and imple-
ment structural reforms in support of economic effi-
ciency and social development are paying off. Growth
has resumed and social indicators are improving. But
there is little room for complacency in pursuing the
necessary additional reforms that would put the coun-
try on a trajectory of sustained, stronger growth in
the years to come. Further efforts towards this end
could focus on two main areas. 
First, macroeconomic stability, which is an important
framework condition for growth, needs to be consoli-
dated. Effort to stem the increase in current govern-
ment spending would create room in the budget for
much-needed investment and pave the way for a reduc-
tion in the tax take in the future, once the public debt
has been reduced further. Lower indebtedness is also
needed to reduce Brazil’s high real
interest rates. Appropriate instru-
ments will need to be put in place
to save or invest in a manner that
benefits future generations the
revenue that is expected to accrue
to the government budget when
the recently discovered oil and gas
reserves come on stream. 
Second, effort to close a gap in edu-
cational attainment and student
performance in relation to the
OECD area would put Brazil in a
better stead to compete in interna-
tional markets. To the extent that
better education outcomes raise
labour productivity, continued
human capital accumulation
would contribute to improving fur-
ther Brazil’s distribution of
income, which remains skewed
even by Latin American standards.
Implement of much needed further
structural reforms in several areas,
including the tax code, product
market regulations and foreign
trade and investment regimes, will
require resolute policy action to
remove those impediments to
entrepreneurship and productivity
gains that ultimately stymie the
country’s growth potential. 
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